

Policymaking in the Global Context: Training Students to Build Effective Strategic Partnerships With Nongovernmental Organizations

Cristina M. Balboa

Baruch College School of Public Affairs, City University of New York

Maryam Z. Deloffre

Arcadia University

ABSTRACT

In the global realm, public policy issues—*infectious disease, immigration, and human rights*—regularly cross national boundaries without any one government to assume responsibility and authority on the issue. Policy makers must therefore shift their focus from “government” to “governance” and create strategic partnerships that leverage existing capacities to provide global public goods. This paper examines the importance of the global arena to Master of Public Policy (MPP) and Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs, and offers evidence of the increasing role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in governance. Using the current Ebola crisis in West Africa as an example, we demonstrate how NGOs’ engagement in global governance requires different skills and discussions, not just for nonprofit staff, but also for government and business sectors. In conclusion, this article offers suggestions for how MPP and MPA programs might begin to incorporate the concepts of these important non-state actors into public affairs curricula.

KEYWORDS

International NGOs, global governance, global policy making, capacity building, partnerships

Many of the articles in this symposium focus on the importance of incorporating nonprofits into graduate programs in public affairs and public policy. Those who turn their attention toward the global sphere will find the importance of focusing on nonprofits or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is even more pronounced.¹ In the global realm, *infectious disease, ecosystem conservation, immigration, and human rights* regularly cross boundaries without any one government capable of assuming responsibility and authority on the

issue. Transnational NGOs play an increasing role in bridging these domestic and international policy realms and making, influencing, and implementing policy. The current and ongoing example of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa serves as a poignant illustration of how U.S. government institutions in particular must adapt to collaborating with NGOs in global contexts. The ability of public affairs graduates to address societal issues in a globalized world is dependent upon their ability to operate with and within NGOs.

Globalization has changed approaches to governance in several important ways. First, scholars and practitioners alike now understand that many of the issues that policy makers face are not neatly contained by national boundaries. The fair trade products available for purchase in the United States were grown, harvested and processed elsewhere. The democracies that develop and atrophy are funded, trained, and held accountable by governments, organizations, and citizens far beyond their boundaries. Public health epidemics can be transported to new locales via a six-hour plane ride. The effects of industrial practices in one place have direct consequences for issues of resource use, climate change, and waste disposal in another. What's more, recent technological advances have increased the ease of communication and availability of information (Cope, Leishman, & Starie, 1997), giving today's civil society the potential to be more informed and active in their governance, and the governance of others, than in previous years (Florini, 2000; Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski, & Anheier, 2000). With this expanded reach, increased connectivity, and amplified complexity of trade, technology, and information, globalization not only places new demands on governments, but also complicates policy agendas (Esty & Ivanova, 2002).

With no central government to address these global and transnational issues, the concept of "governing" has been converted from an actor to an act, from "government" to "governance." *Governance* has been defined as "any form of creating or maintaining political order and providing common goods for a given political community on whatever level" (Risse, 2005, p. 165). States are no longer the only actors called upon to solve the world's ills. Multiple actors—NGOs, industry, state and local governments, intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations—all work together to solve issues or provide the services needed.

This multi-actor approach to governing affects every actor involved in an issue. It increases the role of NGOs and for-profit firms in creating

both public goods and the rules that regulate those goods (Avant, Finnemore, & Sell, 2010; Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999). It changes the way states and local governments interact with non-state actors. These changes require different expertise and different rules of engagement across the board. Actors are no longer merely providers of public goods; the diversity and reach of those goods are expanding. All actors must build their abilities to connect disparate organizations, peoples, and approaches. NGOs, because of their flexibility and focus on mission, have often been identified as the connective tissue between state and non-state actors, the local to the global (and back to the local again), diaspora to country of origin, and expertise to expertise (DeMars & Dijkzeul, 2015). How are MPP and MPA graduates being prepared to be effective in this new era—and new arena—of global governance?

To expand this symposium's argument that nonprofits are an integral part of public policy and public affairs, this paper broadens the scope of study to the international arena. First, we will describe the importance of NGOs in this global arena and as transnational actors. Second, we will detail how the specific role of NGOs in governance requires students to develop a detailed understanding of capacity and accountability. Using the current Ebola crisis in West Africa as an example, we will demonstrate how the important role of NGOs in global governance requires different skills and discussions, not just for nonprofit staff, but also for the government and business sectors. Next, we will examine the state of the art in MPP/MPA programs that self-report concentrations on the international arena to the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA) in order to provide some descriptive data on whether and how the global and NGOs are incorporated in the curriculum. In conclusion, this article will offer some suggestions on how MPP and MPA programs might begin to incorporate the concepts of these important non-state actors into the public affairs curricula.

THE INCREASING ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Definitions of NGOs abound, and while there is some debate on the finer points, there is consensus on several core features that constitute an NGO. NGOs have formal organization, exist independently of government (nongovernmental), place constraints on the redistribution of earnings (nonprofit), have voluntary membership, and are motivated by achieving a public good (Lewis, 2007; Salamon, 1994). NGOs are widely considered to be significant actors in global affairs, with numerous scholars showing how their advocacy and activism impacts global policy making on topics ranging from traditional security concerns to human rights to environmental conservation and the provision of public goods in the global arena (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Price, 2003; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999)². Moreover, in the absence of a world government, NGOs play a role both in coordinating state behavior and in shaping the normative context in ways that change the identities, interests, and preferences of international actors (Balboa, 2014; Boli & Thomas, 1999; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Murdie & Hicks, 2013). We suggest that three indicators serve to measure the influence, presence, and soft power of NGOs in global policy making and implementation: the number of NGOs registered both globally and in the United States, the presence of NGOs in global policy arenas, and the revenue flows to (and from) NGOs.

One indicator of NGO influence is the number of NGOs officially registered in a given country. Bloodgood and Schmitz show that the number of transnational NGOs registered in the United States almost doubled from 3,548 in 1998 to 6,790 in 2008, and their revenue more than tripled, from USD 9.7 billion to USD 31.9 billion, in the same time period (Bloodgood & Schmitz, 2013, p. 67). Furthermore, while international NGOs comprise only 1.9% of all nonprofits registered in the United States, they

collectively received an estimated 2.9% of all charitable contributions in 2009, and their growth has surpassed that of other nonprofit sectors in the United States (Bloodgood & Schmitz, 2013, p. 67).

Globally, the number of active NGOs has increased 40% in the past 20 years, from 21,010 in 1995 to 29,387 in 2014 (Yearbook of International Organizations, 2014). The number of NGOs with an international focus has increased by 15% in just the past five years (i.e., from 6,825 in 2010 to 7,875 in 2014; Yearbook of International Organizations, 2014). While North America seems to have had the smallest membership growth of all the regions from 1990 to 2010, it still registered a 43% increase in NGO membership (Anheier, 2014). On the other extreme, Eastern Europe has demonstrated membership growth an order of magnitude greater than North America, with a 426% increase in NGO members between 1990 and 2010 (Anheier, 2014).

A recent study of transnational NGOs in the United States and in New York City in particular (Balboa, Berman, & Welton, 2015) indicates that circa 2009, there were almost 7,500 NGOs in the United States, generating revenue of over USD 30 billion. In that same time frame, in the New York City metropolitan area alone, 943 NGOs raised USD 4.3 billion in revenues. While many of these organizations were focused on increasing international understanding (12.7% nationally and 12.3% in New York City) through cultural exchanges and educational opportunities, others were focused on international affairs (6.3% nationally and 8.9% in New York City). The overwhelming majority of NGOs focused on development and assistance (66.4% nationally and 51.4% in New York City). Clearly the state is not the only player in international development.

These data points on the numbers of NGOs registered in the United States and globally

indicate an upward trend, but do increasing numbers correlate to increasing influence? While the world is globalizing, it is still largely state-centric, and NGOs may not have access to the policy-making arena in the same ways states do. One indicator for measuring influence is whether NGOs are present and part of global decision-making processes.

To gain access to the United Nations (UN), NGOs may seek accreditation through the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC), which confers consultative status and access to ECOSOC and other UN bodies. Through consultative status, NGOs have an increasing presence at the UN; the number of NGOs with consultative status rose from 41 in 1946 to about 700 in 1992, surged to 3,536 in 2011, and at last report, in 2014, included 4,164 NGOs (Bloodgood & Schmitz, 2013; Casey, in press; Yearbook of International Organizations, 2014). Furthermore, Karns and Mingst (2009) discuss the increasing participation of NGOs in UN-sponsored global and ad hoc conferences: While only 250 NGOs participated in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden, close to 1,400 attended the 1992 UN Conference of the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the Rio agenda specifically assigned NGOs a key role in implementing the policy objectives developed during the conference (Karns & Mingst, 2009, pp. 233–234). Upward trends in NGOs with consultative status and NGO presence at UN conferences suggest that as NGO numbers increase, their visibility and access to international policy-making venues rise as well.

A final indicator of NGO influence and power is the amount of money allocated to NGOs by public and private donors. In the global arena, governments provide the majority of funding for humanitarian crises, accounting for approximately 85.6% (or USD 17.9 billion) of total global humanitarian funding in fiscal year 2014.³ In large part, NGOs are the preferred

vehicles for delivering humanitarian aid; in 2014 NGOs received 11.6% (USD 2.5 billion) of committed/contributed global humanitarian funding and 14% (USD 207.6 million) of pledged contributions (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014). Between 2007 and 2011, donors from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) disbursed 24% of their funding directly to NGOs (first-level recipients), while 53% of the funding was channeled through multilateral organizations that sometimes subsequently made grants to NGOs (second-level recipients; Buston & Smith, 2013, p. 61). Private donors (including both institutional and individual donors) donated approximately 30% of their funding directly to NGOs during the 2007–2011 time period (Buston & Smith, 2013, p. 61). In 2012, nearly USD 2.3 billion, or 19% of international humanitarian assistance, went directly to NGOs (Swithern, 2014, p. 58).

U.S. NGOs focused on foreign assistance (known as Private Voluntary Organizations or PVOs) also maintain substantial revenue streams. The United States Agency of International Development (USAID) acknowledges this symbiotic relationship: "Behind the successes of U.S. Foreign Assistance, there are many strong partnerships between USAID and the PVO community" (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2014, p. 4). With almost 550 U.S.-based PVOs and 115 non-U.S. PVOs registered with USAID as of 2012, these organizations act as implementing partners for the U.S. Government's development goals. However, they do so maneuvering constantly between public and private actors.

For instance, U.S.-based PVOs raised close to USD 27 billion in fiscal year 2012 alone. Only 10% of those funds came from USAID, while 75% came from private funders. The non-U.S.-based PVOs raised over USD 5 billion, with only 4% coming from USAID; 42% came from private funders, and the remainder (54%)

from other sources, which may include other government agencies in the U.S. or abroad. These are substantial amounts of revenue, which NGOs spend either directly implementing programs or supporting local partner NGOs in 186 countries. Specifically, in 2012, there were 102 countries in which these PVOs worked with 10 or more local NGOs (USAID, 2014).

GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND THE CASE OF EBOLA

Just as nonprofits increasingly play a notable role in implementing, regulating, and evaluating policy in the domestic context, NGOs also bridge domestic and global contexts and complement the U.S. government's capacity to attend to global issues. One sector where this is plain is global public health. The global health community extends far beyond government and includes a panoply of actors: bilateral aid agencies (such as USAID); domestic and transnational NGOs; private foundations; multinational corporations; intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, and the UN; and advocacy groups. Given that many public health concerns transcend national boundaries and thus require coordinated action and massive financial investment, a purely state-centric approach is no longer appropriate.

Furthermore, governments now view global health as a foreign policy priority because it raises concerns about national security interests as well as human security—a concept that broadens the conventional understanding of security to include a focus on the individual, and considers poverty, health pandemics, and climate-related disasters as security threats (Deloffre, 2015). This view of global health requires coordination both across sectors of government and across the global health community. The United Kingdom, Switzerland, Brazil, and the European Union now espouse government-wide policies to coordinate government offices toward achieving global public health outcomes (Novotny, 2010). The U.S.

government likewise recognizes the necessity to collaborate with multiple sectors in order to achieve global public health outcomes (Novotny, 2010). For example, it launched the Global Health Security Agenda in February 2014, a multiparty effort organized with other countries, international organizations, and private actors mandated with “accelerating progress toward a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats and to promote global health security as an international security priority” (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2015a).

Importantly, the U.S. government acknowledges that “global health security is a shared responsibility that cannot be achieved by a single actor or sector of government” (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2015b). The Global Health Security Agenda highlights the increasingly complex world of policy making and the importance of leveraging the existing capacities of multiple public and private actors to provide essential global public goods and services.

Perhaps one key example of the necessity for government-wide, multisectoral, and international cooperation on global public health that leverages the unique capacities of each sector is the ongoing multi-actor U.S. response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The United States deployed personnel from multiple U.S. departments and agencies to West Africa, including staff from the Department of State and Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; 1,000 staff members), USAID, and the Department of Defense, as well as 3,000 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) troops. Government agencies provided unique logistics and capacities that were critical to successfully abating the global health security crisis. The U.S. Air Force established an air supply line to transport supplies from Senegal into Liberia when airlines stopped traveling to the region; the CDC set up contact-tracing and case-tracking systems; the military sent in mobile

medical laboratories that accelerated the process of testing blood samples and reduced diagnosis times from 24 to 3 hours; the military built Ebola treatment units and field hospitals; and USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team provided interagency coordination on the ground as well as planning, operations, and logistics (Beaubien, 2015; United States Africa Command, 2014; USAID, 2015).

These government officials worked side by side with international NGOs such as *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders in English), Partners in Health, and Samaritan's Purse to provide lifesaving medical treatment. NGOs built and worked in field hospitals, Ebola treatment units, and training facilities, and organized public education and awareness campaigns. NGO capacity complements government capacity, particularly in terms of NGOs' flexibility, rapid response capacity, sustained commitment in local communities, and expertise.

NGOs often have long-standing relationships with local communities and partnerships with local NGOs, which permit rapid response and enable trust building (Deloffre, 2014a). MSF, considered one of the four largest NGOs globally, has unparalleled reach in the area of public health, with an annual revenue of USD 1.2 billion and operating and maintaining local partnerships in 70 countries (Huggett, 2012). These local partnerships were critical in positioning it as one of the first responders to the Ebola crisis, as early as March 2014, and the first to appreciate the true amplitude of the outbreak. In April 2014, MSF warned of the unprecedented nature of the crisis, but the WHO downplayed concerns—in part because it relied on government self-reported data that indicated only a sporadic number of cases (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014; *Médecins Sans Frontières*, 2014; York 2014). Subsequently, the WHO did not declare the outbreak an emergency until August 2014, which left it to chase a runaway crisis rather than take preventive measures to stymie the outbreak's spread.

Moreover, NGOs are instrumental in building trust among local governments, local communities, and international actors. During the Ebola crisis, trust building was critical to fighting stigmas and dispelling rumors and misinformation, which crippled public health campaigns and created hostility and fear of medical personnel and foreigners (Deloffre, 2014a; McNeil & Höije, 2014). Another capacity of NGOs such as MSF is their experience and expertise in supplying acute medical assistance in crisis situations and in developing countries. MSF's protocols and procedures were relatively successful in protecting medical staff and patients and informed the development of operational standards and procedures used by U.S. AFRI-COM troops (Dixon, 2014; United States Department of Defense, 2014).

Meeting the financial requirements of global health crises demands cross-sectoral coordination and capacity as well. As of this writing, the United States and the United Kingdom were the top two state donors to the Ebola crisis, contributing 35% (USD 913 million, with an additional USD 45 million pledged) and 12% (USD 327.9 million, with an additional USD 6.4 million pledged) respectively of the total contributions recorded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). Private donors—including Mark Zuckerberg, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Paul G. Allen Family Foundation—made immediate and direct donations to the foundation of the CDC, circumventing cumbersome government bureaucracy and appropriations regulations and instantaneously funding the needs of CDC teams on the ground (Cha, 2014). In all, 21 foundations contributed over USD 117 million and pledged an additional USD 123 million to the Ebola response.⁴ The Paul G. Allen Family Foundation alone contributed more than USD 100 million. (The OCHA data does not capture an additional USD 25 million donated by Mark Zuckerberg [Cha, 2014].) These types

of strategic partnerships are on the rise, and given the current austere financial climate for governments, might become more prevalent in the future.

Despite the multisectoral collaboration and mobilization of resources to address the Ebola crisis, there remain real limitations to policy implementation of human security objectives. Modifying traditional thinking on security to include human security requires the development of innovative global instruments that articulate the collective responsibility to provide human security and increase collaboration and commitment across all sectors of international activity (Deloffre 2014b). Health governance is still largely state-centric, bureaucratic, and grounded in international law. Bureaucracies are organized around rules, routines, and standard operating procedures to generate predictable responses; these norms and processes improve effectiveness, but can also be cumbersome (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). As previously noted, the WHO's adherence to legal frameworks and scientific procedures delayed its recognition of the Ebola crisis. Incorporating instruction on the global context into the MPP/MPA curriculum, instruction that considers governance in addition to government, might train students to adopt innovative approaches to policy making.

Another reason why current international mechanisms are insufficient is that they do not circle back to the people affected by human security threats. The UN and the WHO comprise member states whose elected representatives are accountable to their national constituencies. To truly develop global instruments for human security, the global community needs to expand the meaning of accountability to reflect the transnational interactions that transcend and breach state boundaries (Deloffre, 2014b). People-centered human security needs people-centered accountability, and one task for MPP/MPA programs is to educate and train students how to think about, implement, and practice accountability in the global sphere.

HOW DO NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COMPLICATE THE CONCEPT OF CAPACITY?

As the lines between public and private actors in governance blur, and the roles of non-state actors in the creation and delivery of public goods and services is increasingly accepted and harnessed by those seeking to influence a policy area, MPP/MPA graduates need to interact with a diverse set of actors operating in multiple contexts simultaneously. Regardless of whether they work in government, industry, foundations, or NGOs, public affairs graduates will have to learn not only the specific types of skills that will help them work effectively with different actors in various contexts, but also the metaskills of assessing which skill to employ in each context.

Previous work on capacity demonstrates the importance of assessing it at the global, national, and local levels, as well as of considering the characteristics of the policy task when deploying capacities (Balboa, 2014; Bell, Murdie, Blocksome, & Brown, 2013).⁵ Balboa (2014) offers a typology that classifies capacity into three distinct categories—political (i.e., how an organization interacts with external actors), administrative (i.e., how an organization functions internally through policies and procedures for its staff and resources), and technical (i.e., how an organization achieves the technical aspects of its mission)—and considers how each capacity manifests differently on the global, national, and local levels.

In the global sphere, political capacity means raising funds to enable making and implementing policy; managing media outlets; and coordinating multiple actors to facilitate interventions. At the local level, political capacity might require culturally sensitive communications that enable trust building and stakeholder negotiations with local leaders (i.e., tribal leaders and religious authorities) to implement the policies created at the global sphere. While the global technical capacity of practicing the most cutting-edge medical interventions is

important to situations such as the recent Ebola outbreak, these interventions will need to be adapted to reflect the local habits and cultural norms that impact the spread of the disease. Administratively, only states, IGOs, and the military have the capacity needed to mobilize and coordinate a global intervention with the structures and policies that facilitate communication and resource sharing.

Each actor working on an issue will demonstrate different strengths and weaknesses by capacity type or by sphere in which it operates. Bell and colleagues (2013) examine the impact of joint civil and military interventions on human security outcomes. They conclude that for more complex human security outcomes (e.g., those involving nonlinear and tightly coupled tasks), combined NGO and military efforts generate more favorable outcomes. However, analysis of the context and the capacities of different actors is critical to these efforts, so that the presence of one actor does not diminish the value-added of the other. For instance, military interventions can make publics distrustful, so policy makers must balance roles in a way where NGO trust-building capacity is not reduced by a military presence.

Just because one actor exhibits skills in the global sphere does not mean it will be effective in the local sphere, and vice versa (Balboa, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2011). Indeed, trying to use these global capacities at the local sphere could actually hurt an actor's chances of implementing its mission, as illustrated by the WHO's attempt to rely on its technical and scientific procedures for data reporting in countries that lacked the infrastructure and reporting capacities to provide accurate data. The communication approach of reporting program progress to a global funder will likely not be well received when reporting to a local leader. Trying to influence global policy making at the international convention level in the same manner as an actor would influence local policy and politics will likely result in failure. Since political, techno-

logical, and administrative capacity are interdependent capacities for making an organization effective, inability to use one type of sphere-specific capacity (e.g., local administrative capacity) could result in rendering the other two types of capacity (e.g., local technical and political capacities) ineffective as well.

In addition to understanding which capacities are present and appropriate in which spheres, Balboa (2014) suggests that the most important capacity is *bridging capacity*. This capacity has three elements: (a) in-depth intercultural and cross-cultural (ICCC) understanding; (b) commitment and discipline to act as an intermediary; and (c) enough power in the organization to influence or change how work is done. This type of capacity is particularly important for NGOs, who often fill the role of connecting the local and the global, and connecting the multiple actors working within each of these spheres (DeMars & Dijkzeul, 2015).

Understanding accountability relationships is an important and specific form of political capacity, essential to creating strategic alliances to address the world's policy issues. At the global level there are no clear and comprehensive representatives of civil society. Each actor represents a portion of civil society, and that portion of civil society has the means for calling only a few actors accountable. For example, is the state primarily accountable to the demos, and is it responsive to its needs? Is a business primarily accountable to its stakeholders for financial return? Are medical professionals focused on their missions of creating the public good of global health for all? All actors must assess to whom they are accountable, for what, and how. Moreover, to be effective, MPP/MPA graduates must recognize these multiple calls for accountability from various stakeholders, understand the prioritization of accountability relationships each actor makes, and use this information to negotiate between actors, optimize engagement in strategic alliances, and create organizational structures and policies that

TABLE 1.
Potential Sphere-Specific Capacities of Actors Involved in the 2014 West Africa Ebola Crisis

Sphere	Actor		
	State agencies	NGOs	Military agencies
Global	<p>P: (donor country) Coordinating multiple actors; informing public through media outlets; working within parameters of foreign aid processes; access to IGOs; mobilizing financial resources</p> <p>P: (host country) Legitimacy and authority outside the state to raise awareness about needs; access to IGOs</p>	<p>P: Ability to mobilize financial resources; to raise awareness; to name and shame; sometimes access to IGOs; disseminating information</p> <p>A: Travel logistics for medical professionals; funder reporting requirements</p>	<p>P: Well-funded; receive media attention</p> <p>A: Hierarchical command structure; efficient decision making; planning</p>
National	<p>P: Working with national governments and NGOs to strategize efforts</p>	<p>P: Enabling access and facilitating acceptance via the organization's principles</p> <p>A & P: Obtaining visas and required paperwork for medical professionals to enter country; nonprofit status</p> <p>T: Collecting information, testimony, evidence, etc.</p>	<p>T & P: Interacting with local military; engaging national infrastructure; communication networks</p>
Local	<p>P: (host country) Legitimacy and authority within the state; ability to mobilize populations; ability to mobilize local resources</p> <p>T: (host country) Understanding of local customs, traditions, myths and practices; local language</p>	<p>T: Previous experience working with infectious disease; operational and safety standards; medical treatment of the infected; local disease status; training of local health professionals; public education; community mobilization; community building</p> <p>A: Logistics of hosting medical professionals</p> <p>P: Ability to build and maintain trust in local populations; coordinating with local health care professionals to strategize local interventions; understanding cultural barriers and bridges to disease containment</p>	<p>P: Local communication; partnerships and capacity building of local law enforcement</p> <p>T: Logistics including heavy machinery, transportation, and construction materials; infrastructure development; scientific expertise; security</p>

Notes. NGO = nongovernmental organization; IGO = intergovernmental organizations. T = technical capacity; P = political capacity; A = administrative capacity (Balboa, 2014).

reflect these hierarchies (Balboa, 2015; Koppell, 2005; Wong, 2012).

Table 1 distills a few of the capacity differences, in the global, national, and local spheres that have been exhibited by state agencies, NGOs, and military actors engaged in addressing the Ebola crisis. While not an exhaustive list of capacities or actors, Table 1 clearly demonstrates both the symbiotic relationship of these actors as well as the differences in capacity by sphere of influence. At the national level, state agencies coordinate national strategies based on the data collected by NGOs. The local technical capacity of an NGO's medical professionals to address infectious disease is complemented by the military's technical ability to build infrastructure so that patients can be treated. In addition, one can see that the political capacity needed to raise funds at the global scale is distinct from

(but perhaps dependent upon) NGOs' political capacity to maintain trust at the local sphere. Understanding these differences and interdependencies is a part of building public affairs students' bridging capacities to create strategic alliances for public good.

Thus, at the global scale, MPP/MPA students need to learn about how NGOs operate, not only to think about each actor's capacity advantages and disadvantages in each sphere, but also to consider how to manage these varying relationships based on a diverse set of accountability priorities (see Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Lipsky, 2011). Most important, MPP/MPA graduates must acquire the bridging capacity to maneuver within their organization and with other organizations in the field. They must learn to communicate with multiple actors in the way those actors want to

TABLE 2.
Indicators of International/Global- or NGO-Focused MPP/MPA Programs

International/globally-focused programs that have at least one:	Number of programs	Percentage of programs
Core course with global focus	8	18%
Core course with NGO focus	8	18%
Core course with both global and NGO focus	0	0%
Elective course with global focus	30	86%
Elective course with NGO focus	28	80%
Elective course with both global and NGO focus	6	17%
Tenure-track faculty with NGO focus	33	73%
Adjunct faculty with NGO focus	20	44%

Notes. N programs = 45. MPP = Master of Public Policy; MPA = Master of Public Administration; NGO = nongovernmental organization.

TABLE 3.
Indicators of NGO Focus in Internationally/Globally Focused MPP/MPA Programs

Type of offering	Number of programs				
	0 offered	1 offered	2-5 offered	6-10 offered	11+ offered
Core courses with NGO focus	37	6	2	0	0
Elective courses with NGO focus	7	9	11	7	1
Tenure-track faculty with NGO focus	12	6	22	3	2
Adjunct faculty with NGO focus	25	9	9	0	2

Notes. *N* programs = 45. MPP = Master of Public Policy; MPA = Master of Public Administration; NGO = nongovernmental organization.

communicate—in glossy annual reports, in daily face-to-face communication, or in multimedia presentations. They must understand the accountability relationships that drive each actor—for example, funding relationships, mission achievements, or processes for following scientific protocols or incorporating stakeholder input. Lastly, MPP/MPA graduates must strive to connect various actors in a way that is most productive to solving the issue at hand.

HOW DOES THE CURRENT ACADEMIC APPROACH ADDRESS THESE ISSUES?

What is the state of the field with respect to integrating the global arena and an understanding of NGOs in MPP/MPA programs? We used NASPAA's specialization/concentrations fields to select the population of programs classified as “international/global” (48 schools). We consulted websites for each program during January and February 2015 using a codebook to gather and standardize descriptive data on each program.⁶

Our brief analysis of these programs offers an informative snapshot about how MPP/MPA programs incorporate (or do not incorporate)

NGO knowledge in teaching. Of the 304 schools (both accredited and nonaccredited) listed by NASPAA, only 48 (or 15.7%) claim an “international/global” focus.⁷ This low number is understandable considering that many internationally focused programs offer a Master's of International Affairs rather than a MPP or MPA. However, of those programs that do claim an international focus, the data indicates that while 73% have tenure-track faculty whose work focuses on NGOs, less than 18% of these programs have a core course that focuses on nonprofits or NGOs. There are no programs in this population of internationally or globally focused MPP/MPA programs that offer core courses with titles that include both nonprofits/NGOs and the global/international sphere. Table 2 provides a summary of our findings.

The high number of tenure-track faculty focusing on NGOs means that these programs do not necessarily have to employ adjuncts to create the NGO focus. Of the 12 programs that do not have full-time NGO-focused faculty, three list adjunct faculty with an NGO focus, which brings the total percentage of internationally focused MPP/MPA programs

that have faculty capacity to teach courses on NGOs to 80%. The disparity between the percentage of faculty who focus on NGOs and the number of core courses on NGOs indicates that course requirements for internationally focused MPP/MPA degrees do not fully optimize faculty capacity or scholarly interest. However, of the 37 programs that offer no core courses with an NGO focus, 23 offer NGO-focused elective courses. This brings the total percentage of programs with any courses on NGOs to 72%, a number that indicates that programs are starting to recognize that NGOs are important enough to governance to be taught in the classroom. The next step is to create core courses that deliberately teach about them.

Our data also indicate that two of the eight programs that require an NGO-focused core course for the degree actually require more than one course (see Table 3). Of the 28 programs that offer NGO-focused elective courses, 25% offer only one such course, while over 28% offer six or more NGO-focused electives. One outlier program offers 16 such electives. Most of the programs that employ NGO-focused tenure-track faculty and adjunct faculty seem to hire more than one faculty member with an NGO focus.

NEXT STEPS

What types of courses and methods might help public affairs students acquire the knowledge they need as the focus of governing becomes less on one actor (the state) and more on the functions of governance performed by multiple actors? How might our programs begin to incorporate these important actors into our curricula? To begin, there are certain approaches to teaching that would expose students to the nuances presented in this article, including case studies, role playing, and service learning.

Hundreds of nonprofit-management case studies are available through the Rutgers University Cases and Simulations Portal for Nonprofit and Public Sectors; the Harvard Business Review's Case Study Collection; the University of

Washington Daniel J. Evans School of Public Policy and Governance Electronic Hallway now contains 80 cases on nonprofits/NGOs with a few focused on the global context; and the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs recently launched the Hubert Project, which includes some e-cases with the potential for expansion to cases that specifically focus on NGOs. Case studies are tools that can help build administrative and political capacity. Using nonprofit case studies in general management courses would expose students to the distinct set of strengths and difficulties NGOs encounter when trying to achieve their missions and contribute to solving the world's ills. Requiring students to apply management concepts and practices for these actors would increase students' administrative capacity. For example, Bansal and Ewart's (2007) case study on CARE Kenya requires students to analyze the capacities of CARE Kenya, the Kenyan government, Kenyan farmers, and food export multinational corporations to design a management solution to save CARE Kenya's failing social enterprise. CARE Kenya's program had been designed to improve the livelihood of Kenyan farmers by linking them to global markets, but the NGO's lack of business knowledge and dependence on external grants made the innovative program unsustainable. To design a sustainable partnership to resurrect the program, students must analyze the case and the capacities of each actor.

Focusing on case studies that address policy issues on a broader scale would increase students' political capacity for negotiating between multiple actors and creating strategic partnerships. While Harvard's case study collection include over 100 case studies that focus on international NGOs, the complexity of NGOs and their relationships with other actors indicates that even more could be written. In the absence of a published case study on a specific issue of importance to a class, faculty can use collections of articles from news sources and frame the process of discussion to address the needs, strengths, and weaknesses of each policy actor.

As more active engagement in a case study, role-playing simulations have been promoted as a means for increasing high-level learning for students (Silvia, 2012). Like traditional case studies, these simulations focus on real-life examples. Unlike traditional case studies, simulations divide students into different types of actors, each with their own motivations, obligations, and intentions. In simulations, students develop transportable leadership skills such as bridging capacity, which will equip them to address real issues (Figueroa, 2014). The political capacity developed through simulations can go far in helping students forge strategic alliances and bridge the differences between different actors and different spheres of influence.

Only one program in our population of internationally or globally focused MPP/MPA programs offers a service-learning component.⁸ Service learning provides a deep approach to learning that permits students to link theory to practice in ways that can also help build capacities in the communities where students live and work (Bringle & Hatcher, 1999). Deloffre designed a service-learning project, with the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), for her graduate-level class in NGO management. AFSC projects allow students to gain hands-on experience in how to use program planning, evaluation, and problem-analysis skills in real-world global contexts. Furthermore, since students are trained in the social sciences, they introduce new perspectives, practices, and methodologies to the organization, offering culturally sensitive solutions and analyses adapted to the political, social, and economic contexts of AFSC programs.

While these real-world examples and experiential approaches to learning can serve as a start to equipping students with the necessary skills to maneuver in this new era of governance, ideally these experiences would build upon a solid base of concepts and theories taught and reinforced in multiple settings and courses. In terms of coursework, this paper's example of

the Ebola intervention and discussion of capacity suggest that all MPP/MPA programs should teach courses on global governance with an emphasis on global policy making, NGOs in global politics, global capacity building, and global accountabilities. What is equally clear is that although these internationally focused MPP and MPA programs have faculty who focus research on NGOs, a deliberate effort to teach about NGO actors in core courses is still lacking. Here the discipline of public policy and public administration might follow the lead of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, which offers resources for conducting monitoring, evaluation, and organizational learning in peace-building contexts, toward developing better resources for teaching about NGOs and the global arena in policy programs.

While many of the skills and concepts raised in this article flag the importance of teaching about NGOs in the MPP/MPA curriculum, it is important to acknowledge what skills public affairs graduates would lack without this discussion. Students who do not receive exposure to NGO concepts might not fully understand the increasing role of private actors in governance across the globe. They will not be equipped to assess different actors' capacity strengths and weaknesses at the multiple spheres in which global governance occurs. They will not fully grasp the nuances of exerting power in arenas where no one actor has absolute power. They will have limited ability to understand the constraints under which multiple actors operate and create for each other because of their accountability relationships.

Public affairs graduates also might not be able to take advantage of the opportunities that non-state actors create, operating outside of the bureaucracy of the state and with the growing magnitude of funding private actors have to offer in an effort to address their causes. In the global sphere, this multi-actor approach is how governance happens. To prepare public affairs students to address climate change, immigration, human rights, or fostering of democracy,

programs must equip them to create, manage, and lead strategic alliances regardless of the sector in which they work. Whether in the realm of local, state, or national government, NGO, or business (or global institutions encompassing all of these actors, like intergovernmental organizations), the charge is clear: teach students to transform the blurred lines that used to divide actors into lines that connect them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank the journal editors, symposium editors, and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and suggestions. We would also like to thank Samantha Wolk and Lena Kushnir for skillful research assistance and data collection.

NOTES

- 1 We use the term *NGO* because it is commonly used in international relations literature. The term *nonprofit*, more often used in public policy and administration, implies a particular legal status—501(c)(3)—that is specific to the U.S. context (see also Stroup, 2012). We use the term *transnational NGO* to refer specifically to NGOs whose primary activity involves delivering services or advocacy across national borders.
- 2 The voluminous literature on NGOs is too large to cite here; these are examples of seminal works.
- 3 This number excludes the contributions labeled “various,” “private,” “carry-over,” “unearmarked UN funds,” “World Bank,” and “others” as reported by the Financial Tracking Service (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014).
- 4 These numbers are most likely an underestimate

of private foundation giving to the Ebola response because the data is self-reported and does not capture all global giving. (Numbers here are calculated from *Ebola Virus Outbreak—West Africa—Table A: List of All Commitments/Contributions and Pledges, as of February 10, 2015* [Data set], retrieved from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service website at http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E16506_asof__1502101846.pdf.)

- 5 See also the rich literature on the comparative advantages of NGOs, states, and other actors and the costs and benefits of partnerships, literature that includes Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002; and Lipsky, 2011.
- 6 Codebook terms for programs with an “international/global” focus include *international*, *global*, *comparative*, or *world*. Codebook terms for programs with an “NGO” focus include *nonprofit*, *not-for-profit*, *nongovernmental organizations/NGOs*, *philanthropy*, *philanthropic*, *public charities/charitable*, *third-party governance*, *third sector*, *voluntary sector*, *civil-society organizations (CSOs)*, or *private-public partnerships*. We searched for these terms in each program’s course titles and faculty descriptions as indicators of course or research focus.
- 7 While there were 48 programs listed as specializing in “international/global” studies on the NASPAA website (<http://www.naspaa.org/students/graduate/schsearch.asp>), our analysis uses subsets of this sample based on the data available on the Internet. Thus, the *N* available for the core course and faculty data is 45. The elective course data has an *N* of 35.
- 8 It is possible that some courses include service-learning components; our analysis only captures instances where service learning is a dedicated course.

REFERENCES

- Anheier, H. K. (2014). *Nonprofit organizations: Theory, management, policy*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Alliance for Peacebuilding. (2015). *Peacebuilding evaluation: Measuring, learning, and improving*

- from our experiences. Retrieved from <http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/our-work/about-our-work/peacebuilding-evaluation/>.
- Avant, D. D., Finnemore, M., & Sell, S. K. (2010). *Who governs the globe?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Balboa, C. M. (2014). How successful transnational non-governmental organizations set themselves up for failure on the ground. *World Development*, 54, 273–287.
- Balboa, C. M. (2015). Accountability and legitimacy of international NGOs. In W. E. DeMars & D. Dijkzeul (Eds.), *The NGO challenge to international relations theory* (pp. 159–187). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Balboa, C. M., Berman, A., & Welton, L. (2015). *International NGOs in New York City: A comparative study*. New York, NY: Baruch College Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management. Retrieved from <http://tinyurl.com/INGONYC>.
- Bansal, P., & Ewart, T. (2007). *CARE Kenya: Making social enterprise sustainable*. Watertown, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Beaubien, J. (Narrator). (2015, February 11). The U.S. helped beat back Ebola—only not in the way you might think [Radio broadcast episode]. *All Things Considered*. Washington, DC: National Public Radio. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/blogs/goatsandsoda/2015/02/11/385489704/the-u-s-helped-beat-back-ebola-only-not-in-the-way-you-might-think>.
- Bell, S. R., Murdie, A., Blocksome, P., & Brown, K. (2013). Force multipliers: Conditional effectiveness of military and INGO human security interventions. *Journal of Human Rights*, 12(4), 397–422.
- Bloodgood, E., & Schmitz, H. P. (2013). The INGO research agenda: A community approach to challenges in method and theory. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of international organization* (pp. 67–79). London, UK: Routledge.
- Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (Eds.). (1999). *Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bringle, R. G., & Hatcher, J. A. (1999). Reflection in service learning: Making meaning of experience. In Campus Compact (Ed.), *Introduction to service-learning toolkit: Readings and resources for faculty* (pp. 113–119). Boston, MA: Campus Compact.
- Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Government-nonprofit partnership: A defining framework. *Public Administration and Development*, 22(1), 19–30.
- Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2011). David and Goliath: Diaspora organizations as partners in the development industry. *Public Administration and Development*, 31(1), 37–49.
- Brinkerhoff, J. M., & Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2002). Government-nonprofit relations in comparative perspective: Evolution, themes, and new directions. *Public Administration and Development*, 22(1), 3–18.
- British Broadcasting Corporation. (2014, October 17). Ebola crisis: WHO accused of “failure” in early response. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29668603>.
- Buston, O., & Smith, K. (2013) *Global humanitarian assistance report*. Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives.
- Casey, J. (In press.). *The nonprofit world: Civil society and the rise of the nonprofit sector*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Cha, A. E. (2014, November 16). In Ebola fight, private foundations provide critical financial aid. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/in-ebola-fight-private-foundations-provide-critical-financial-aid/2014/11/16/b57ec57e-6109-11e4-9f3a-7e28799e0549_story.html.
- Cope, S., Leishman, F., & Starie, P. (1997). Globalization, new public management and the enabling state: Futures of police management. *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 10(6), 444–460.
- Cutler, C. A., Hauffer, V., & Porter, T. (1999). *Private authority and international affairs*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Deloffre, M. Z. (2014, September 29). Will AFRI-COM's Ebola response be a watershed moment for international action on human security? *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/29/will-africoms-ebola-response-be-watershed-moment-for-international-action-on-human-security/>.
- Deloffre, M. Z. (2014, October 25). Human security in the age of Ebola: Towards people-centered global governance. Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/25/human-security-in-the-age-of-ebola-towards-people-centered-global-governance/>.
- Deloffre, M. Z. (2015). Human security, humanitarian response and Ebola. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 48(1), 13–14.
- DeMars, W., & Dijkzeul, D. (2015) *The NGO challenge to international relations theory*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Dixon, R. (2014, October 16). Aid group has set the gold standard on Ebola safety. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-ebola-doctors-without-borders-20141016-story.html#page=1>.
- Ebrahim, A., & Weisband, E. (2007). *Global accountabilities: Participation, pluralism and public ethics* (pp. 13–28). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Esty, D. C., & Ivanova, M. H. (Eds.). (2002). *Global environmental governance: Options and opportunities*. New Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
- Figueroa, C. (2014). Developing practical/analytical skills for doing leadership through mindful classroom simulations. *Journal of Public Affairs Education*, 20(1), 113–129.
- Florini, A. M. (Ed.). (2000). *The third force: The rise of transnational civil society*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Hermann, M. G., Lecy, J. D., Mitchell, G. E., Pagé, C., Raggio, P., Schmitz, H. P., & Viñuela, L. (2012). Transnational NGOs: A cross-sectoral analysis of leadership perspectives. Retrieved from SSRN (Social Science Research Network) at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191082> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191082>.
- Huggett, J. (2012). Patterns of international non governmental organisation's growth [Policy Brief | Working Paper]. *International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement*. Retrieved from <http://poldev.revues.org/1175>. doi: 10.4000/poldev.1175.
- Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2009). *International organizations: The politics and processes of global governance* (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics* (Vol. 35). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Koppell, J. (2005). Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder.” *Public Administration Review*, 65(1), 94–108.
- Lecy, J. D., Schmitz, H. P., & Swedlund, H. (2012). Non-governmental and not-for-profit organizational effectiveness: A modern synthesis. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 23(2), 434–457.
- Lewis, D. (2007). *The management of non-governmental organizations* (2nd ed.). London, UK: Routledge.
- Lipsky, A. B. (2011). Evaluating the strength of faith: Potential comparative advantages of faith-based organizations providing health services in sub-Saharan Africa. *Public Administration and Development*, 31(1), 25–36.
- McNeil, D. G. Jr., & Höije, K. (2014, November 10). In quick response, Mali thwarts an Ebola outbreak. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/health/quick-response-and-old-fashioned-detective-work-thwart-ebola-in-mali.html?_r=0.
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). (2014, August 27). Ebola: The failures of the international outbreak response. *Le Temps*. Retrieved from <http://www.msf.org/article/ebola-failures-international-outbreak-response>.
- Murdie, A., & Hicks, A. (2013). Can international nongovernmental organizations boost government services? The case of health. *International Organization*, 67(3), 541–573.
- Novotny, T. (2010). Global governance and public health security. In P. F. Diehl & B. Frederking

- (Eds.), *Politics of global governance: International organizations in an interdependent world* (pp. 313–329). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Price, R. (2003). Transnational civil society and advocacy in world politics. *World Politics*, 55(4), 579–606.
- Risse, T. (2005). Global governance and communicative action. In D. Held & M. Koenig-Archibugi (Eds.), *Global governance and public accountability* (pp. 165–189). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.) (1999). *The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Salamon, L. (1994). The rise of the nonprofit sector. *Foreign Affairs*, 73(4), 109–122.
- Salamon, L., Wojciech Sokolowski, S., & Anheier, H. K. (2000). *Social origins of civil society: An overview*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project.
- Silvia, C. (2012). The impact of simulations on higher-level learning. *Journal of Public Affairs Education*, 18(2), 397–422.
- Siméant, J. (2005). What is going global? The internationalization of French NGOs without borders. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(5), 851–883.
- Stroup, S. S. (2012). *Borders among activists: International NGOs in the United States, Britain, and France*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Swithern, S. (2014). *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014*. Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GHA-Report-2014-interactive.pdf>.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2014). Consultative status with ECOSOC and other accreditations [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=false>.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2014). *Global humanitarian donations in 2014: Donor totals, financial tracking service* [Data set]. Retrieved from http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R18_Y2014__1501291539.pdf.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2014, April). *Ebola virus outbreak—West Africa—Table B: Total humanitarian assistance per donor, as of February 10, 2015* [Data set]. Retrieved from http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24_E16506__1502100301.pdf.
- UnitedStatesAfricaCommand. (2014). United assistance team makes significant strides. Retrieved from <http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/23720/united-assistance-team-makes-significant-strides>.
- United States Agency for International Development. (2014). 2014 VOLAG: Report of voluntary agencies. Retrieved from <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Volag2014.pdf>.
- United States Agency for International Development. (2015). Ebola: The response [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://www.usaid.gov/ebola>.
- United States Department of Defense. (2014, October 7). Department of Defense press briefing by General Rodriguez in the Pentagon Briefing Room [Transcript]. Retrieved from <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5515>.
- United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2015a). The global health security agenda. Retrieved from <http://www.globalhealth.gov/global-health-topics/global-health-security/ghsagenda.html>.
- United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2015b). Global health security. Retrieved from <http://www.globalhealth.gov/global-health-topics/global-health-security/index.html>.
- University of Minnesota Humphrey School of Public Affairs. (2015). “Hubert Project.” Retrieved from <http://www.hubertproject.org>.
- University of Washington, Daniel J. Evans School of Public Policy and Governance. (2015). “Electronic Hallway.” Retrieved from <http://hallway.evans.washington.edu>.
- Wong, W. H. (2012). *Internal affairs: How the structure of NGOs transforms human rights*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Yearbook of International Organizations. (2014). *Reference Reviews*, 18(2), 13–14.

York, G. (2014, October 3). Only a few aid agencies willing to help fight Ebola in Africa. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/aid-agencies-fail-to-mobilize-ebola-resources/article20930983/>.

Young, D. R. (2000). Alternative models of government-nonprofit sector relations: Theoretical and international perspectives. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 29(1), 149–72.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Cristina M. Balboa is an assistant professor at the School of Public Affairs at Baruch College, City University of New York and a faculty associate at Baruch's Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management. Her research examines the political institutions of private governance—from nonprofits to networks, certification mechanisms, and global governance organizations.

Maryam Z. Deloffre is an assistant professor of political science at Arcadia University. Her research examines transnational NGO accountability; NGO relations with states, international organizations, and non-state actors; human security; and humanitarianism. She teaches courses on NGOs and NGO management in Arcadia University's master's program in International Peace and Conflict Resolution.